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Abstract. This paper scrutinizes various levels and aspects of Hungarian criminal law from the perspective of 
particularly vulnerable victims, with regard to recent EU legislation. After a short introduction, Section 2 presents 
and compares several notions. The following sections present protective measures and instruments of substantive 
and procedural criminal law as well as the key regulations of the adjoining administrative field. At the end, the 
questions if Hungarian legislation has fully implemented the relevant EU Directive, and what further steps should 
be taken are addressed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
European judicial cooperation has had a long history since the Convention on Extradition.1 
Secondary legal sources of the European Union are increasingly regulating more diverse 
yet inter-connected fields and aspects of criminal law. Some directives, regulations and 
framework decisions deal with actual cooperation, while others focus on substantive or 
procedural matters.2 Latter ones blur the differences among national laws considering the 
field they govern, thus creating more or less universal instruments in European criminal 
law. There are also mixed-typed directives which have basically the same effect and 
bringing in some unique aspects. The Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on establishing minimum standards on the rights, 
support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2001/220/JHA (hereinafter simply the ‘Directive’), the focus of this paper, is one of these 
directives.
European legislation is growing ever stronger roots into the soil of national law. This 
paper may be interpreted as a snapshot of this process taken from one particular angle; 
it shows how much and in what way the unique perspective and certain rules of the 
Directive are implemented in Hungarian national law. The ambition of this paper is to 
      *   Judge; District Court of Szeged. E-mail: czedlig@csongradvb.birosag.hu
1 European Convention on Extradition; Paris, 13.XII.1957.
2 A few examples on cooperative sources are 2002/584/JHA: Council Framework Decision of 
13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States; 
Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the application of the principle 
of mutual recognition to financial penalties; Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of 
crime in the European Union, etc. For procedural matters see, for instance: Council Framework 
Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amending Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 
2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the procedural 
rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions 
rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial; for substantive ones see Council 
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism; Council Framework Decision 
2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector, etc.
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concurrently show the small and large details and perspective rather than showing the whole 
picture in details. The objectives of this paper are to show the results of implementation; 
to dig deeper in substantial law as well as presenting the scheme of the protection of highly 
susceptible individuals by criminal means and the procedural and administrative means of 
protection. Many of these rules are not inspired by the Directive; they are older achievements 
of a national evolution. The current implementation of the Directive only draws more 
attention to them.
The unique perspective is mentioned on purpose as substantive and procedural criminal 
law necessarily focuses on the perpetrator (the defendant) in any legal system. In this 
framework, the victim may only have a secondary role, if any. This main focus should not 
change; not even the Directive has such goal. However, the clear idea is to palpably 
strengthen the somewhat neglected position of the victim. In this sense, the aim is a swift 
change of perspective.3 The Hungarian legislature finally implemented the Directive on 
1st November 2015.4 The implementation is also a good occasion to present the state of this 
change with special regard to particularly vulnerable victims. 
2. NOTIONS OF VICTIM AND PARTICULAR VULNERABILITY
The goal of turning more focus on the victim lies on a mixture of human rights, social, 
psychological and even purely logical grounds that the limited expanse of this paper does 
not allow to elaborate. It is, however, right to clarify in the beginning, who the victim is and 
what makes them particularly vulnerable. 
According to the Directive, the victim is a natural person who has suffered harm, 
including physical, mental or emotional harm or economic loss which was directly caused 
by a criminal offence and in addition, a family member of someone whose death was 
directly caused by a criminal offence and who has suffered harm as a result of that person’s 
death.5 The European Court of Human Right (ECHR), although completely independent 
from EU legislation, applies an almost identical notion.6
These notions are, nevertheless, not in use in Hungarian criminal law, only 
administrative regulations on supporting the victims of crime apply a similar definition (see 
Section 5). The vocabulary is different and more complex; the appropriate word ‘áldozat’ 
has all the general meanings of ‘victim’ but Hungarian criminal jurisprudence and legal 
practice, just like Hungarian itself, uses ‘sértett’ solely for the victim of a criminal offence.7 
The victim, in a procedural sense, means the party whose right or lawful interest has been 
violated or jeopardized by the criminal offense.8 Thus, the victim means the aggrieved party 
3 For the genesis and a deeper analysis of the Directive see Rafaraci (2015) 215.
4 Act CLI of 2015 on Amending Certain Acts to Implement Directive 2012/29/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on establishing minimum standards on 
the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2001/220/JHA (hereinafter: the ‘Implementing Act’).
5 Directive art 2. 1 a).
6 Appendix of Recommendation Rec(2006)8 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on 
assistance to crime victims, art 1.1.
7 It corresponds with the German distinction between ‘das Opfer’ and ‘der Verletzte’, although 
the German Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung, StPO) is not so consequent.
8 Section 51 (1) of Act XIX of 1998 on the Criminal Proceedings. The said act is hereinafter 
referred as ‘Be.’
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in the criminal procedure that is not necessarily a natural person, but can be any legal entity 
e.g., the victim of a theft is always the owner of the taken property. Moreover, the Hungarian 
definition not only implies actual harm but the danger thereof as well. The latter is a 
significant achievement as the European definition of the victim may exclude victims of 
attempted offenses. For example, there is no victim under the Directive in case of an 
attempted murder when no injury is caused at all because the shot misses the victim or the 
poison is spilled instead of being drunk. 
The Hungarian notion, on the other hand, also has its restrictions as it excludes family 
members, which does not prevent the heir of the victim from practicing their procedural 
rights.9 With respect to restrictions, it is important to see that judicial practice does not 
wholeheartedly embrace the idea of totally applying the said definition. A row of cases 
indicate that the victim may only act as a substitute private accuser if he can be considered 
the victim in a narrower, substantive sense as well. This means that the victim may only 
represent the charges himself, given all other conditions are met,10 if the exact legal 
definition of the offense contains either a ‘passive subject’ or a result.11 
The passive subject, being a constituent element of the criminal act, needs further 
explanation. It is any person in the legal definition of a criminal offense whom the conduct 
of the perpetrator affects, in other words, they are the object of the criminal act, when the 
object is a person.12 Considering some offenses, the passive subject is necessarily the victim 
(the aggrieved party). For example, the perpetrator of a homicide is any person who kills 
another human being,13 hence this ‘other human being’ is the passive subject of the 
definition and the victim of the offense. In other cases, the passive subject is not always the 
victim. According to the criminal code, ‘theft’ means when a person takes an object to 
which he is not entitled from somebody else in order to unlawfully appropriate it.14 Among 
these constituent elements, this ‘somebody else’ is the passive subject of the criminal act, 
the person from whom the thing (the object of the criminal act) is taken away. This person 
is, however, not always the owner of the object, e.g., a stolen rented car. The result is an 
element easier to comprehend as it is indeed the result of the conduct, a factual change 
caused by the perpetrator (injury, damages, financial loss, etc.).15 A great deal of criminal 
acts does not contain either a passive subject or a result, which, under the permanent judicial 
practice meaning they do not have any victim in a substantial sense.16 Concerning all these 
  9 Be. s 51 (3).
10 The victim may act as a substitute private accuser, thus taking the prosecutor’s position, in 
case the prosecutor or the investigating authority rejected the report, or terminated the investigation; 
the prosecutor filed formal charges only in respect of a part of the accusation; or the prosecutor 
dropped the charge [Be. s 53 (1)].
11 Opinion No. 90/2011 of the Criminal Chamber of the Curia (BKv. 90/2011.) II.1.
12 Belovics and others (2012) 178; Nagy (2004) 161. 
13 Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code (hereinafter ‘Btk.’) s 160 (1).
14 Btk. s 370 (1).
15 Belovics and others (2012) 183; Nagy (2004) 167.
16 According to case law these offenses include cruelty to animals, perjury, misuse of public 
information, forgery of administrative documents, abuse of authority (BH.2013.183, BH.2010.35, 
BH.2012.88, BH.2012.3, BH.2011.246.) Obviously, any of these offenses may still hurt or jeopardize 
the rights or interests of others.
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offenses, no one can act as a substitute private accuser and no one can act as a private party 
presenting a civil claim.17 
Having collected three different notions of the victim,18 it is appropriate to consider 
who is a particularly vulnerable victim. There is no internationally accepted definition and 
there is no definition in Hungarian law. All notions presented here scratch the same surface 
either in continental legal systems in the practice of international forums, or in common law 
countries. 
ECHR approaches the question from the state’s positive obligation to protect 
individuals from inhuman treatment.19 Children and ‘other vulnerable individuals’ are, in 
particular, entitled to such protection.20 As for the EU, Council Framework Decision 
2001/220/JHA (hereinafter simply ‘the Framework Decision’), being the first, secondary 
legal source dealing with victims of crime, merely provides that member states shall ensure 
that particularly vulnerable victims can benefit from specific treatment best suited to their 
circumstances, without actually defining any factor of particular vulnerability.21 
The Directive goes way further on that path giving indicative lists of reasons and traits of 
particular vulnerability, as well as determining what they might be exposed to secondary 
and repeat victimization, intimidation and retaliation.22 During the victims’ individual 
assessment ‘particular attention’ shall be paid to those who suffered considerable harm due 
to the severity of the crime; those of crimes with a discriminatory motive related to their 
personal characteristics; and victims with relationship to and dependence on the offender. 
The Directive also gives some examples. The severity of the crime justifies the particular 
vulnerability of victims of terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in human beings; victims 
of hate crimes and gender-based violence are vulnerable because of discrimination; while 
the risk of vulnerability may be explained by dependence considering violence in a close 
relationship, sexual violence and exploitation. In other cases, the particular vulnerability 
rises entirely from the victim’s person due to either disabilities, or minor age.23 Children are 
always presumed to have specific protection needs.24
Jenny McEwan divided particularly vulnerable victims into three main categories: 
children, disabled persons and victims in fear or distress25 and her categories can also be 
easily applied to the examples above. Across the Atlantic Ocean, US Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines group victims as unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, 
or otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct,26 which basically also covers 
the same notion in different wording.
17 Victims of a crime may, of course, submit their claim for damages at the civil court any time 
but alternatively, the Be. allows them to sue the defendant for damages directly within the criminal 
procedure. In this case and when the court convicts the defendant as guilty, it also adjudicates the civil 
claim and obliges him to pay the damages for the victim [Be. s 335 (1)]. 
18 For a deeper analysis on different national and international definitions of the victim, see 
Görgényi (2005) 7.
19 Airey v Ireland (1981) Series A no 32 para 32.
20 A. v United Kingdom. (1998) 2 FLR 959 para 22; K.U. v Finland App no 2872/02 (2 Dec 
2008) para 46.
21 Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA art 2 para 2.
22 Directive art 22 para 1.
23 Directive art 22 para 2–3. 
24 Directive art 22 para 4.
25 McEwan (2009) 370–5.
26 Garry (1993) 154. 
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For the further purposes of this paper, victims falling under any of the descriptions 
written above shall be considered particularly vulnerable. The upcoming sections present 
legal instruments that specifically aim their protection, or have such effect.
3. PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE VICTIMS  
IN SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
The general part of the Hungarian Criminal Code (Btk.) deals with basic substantive 
principles, general provisions on the criminal act, substantive rules on penalties and some 
special regulations on soldiers and juveniles. It has not contained special provisions 
considering particularly vulnerable victims, until recently when an amendment of Btk., 
extended the rules of statute-barring with some extra protection for minor victims. This 
thereby ensured that no statute of limitation applies on sexual offenses punishable by an 
imprisonment of more than five years, if at the time when it was committed the victim was 
under the age of eighteen years.27 In addition to that, considering among others kidnapping, 
trafficking in human beings and sexual offenses, the limitation period shall not cover the 
duration until the time the victim reaches the age of eighteen years, or until the time that 
they would have reached that age.28 
The special part of the Btk. contains several offenses that may only be committed 
against particularly vulnerable individuals, mostly but not exclusively children. Considering 
these offenses, the particular vulnerability of the victim itself justifies the criminalization of 
a conduct that is otherwise not punishable. 
A further distinction can be made for children based upon the exact constitutive 
elements of the criminal act. Most conducts of sexual abuse may only be committed against 
victims under the age of 14, as this offense includes only consensual sexual activities.29 
(Non-consenting abuse, sexual violence, is a different offense with more severe punishment.) 
Other, mainly sexual, offenses may only be committed against a person under 18 years. 
Otherwise the same conduct does not constitute a criminal offense at all. This group 
includes one conduct of sexual abuse, when the perpetrator is in a position of trust, authority 
or influence over the victim, as well as one conduct of the felony of pandering, one of the 
felony of procuring for prostitution and two conducts of the felony of abuse of a minor.30 
Inciting substance abuse, exploitation of child prostitution, child pornography and child 
labor are felonies where the victim is always a person under 18 years.31
A typical felony committed exclusively against a child is the ‘abuse of a minor’ which 
is committed by the holder of the custody over the minor by seriously violating the 
obligations arising from their duty and thereby endangering the physical, intellectual, moral 
or mental development thereof.32 This distinction has civil law grounds as not each 
individual under the age of 18 is a minor, married minors are considered to be of legal 
27 Act LXV of 2014 on the Amendment of the Criminal Code for the Enhanced Protection of 
the Children s 1 (1); Btk. s 26 (3) c).
28 Act LXV of 2014 s 1 (2); Btk. s 28 (1a).
29 Btk. s 198 (1)–(3). The perpetrator of this offense is also special, as for most conducts only a 
person over the age of 18 years is responsible. 
30 Btk. s 198 (4); 200 (2); 201 (1) c); 208 (2).
31 Btk. s 181, 203, 204 and 209.
32 Btk. s 208 (1)
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age.33 Therefore the said offense may not be committed against a married and hence legally 
adult 17-year-old.34 The victim of the of the offenses ‘preventing the exercise of visitation 
rights’ and ‘changing of the custody of a minor’ may also only be a minor in its civil law 
sense.35
Some other specific offenses protect victims particularly vulnerable because of 
different reasons. This is a rather heterogeneous group. One form of plundering is basically 
a more severely punished theft against a person incapable of self-defense or whose ability 
to recognize or prevent the criminal act is diminished due to his old age or disability.36 
The felony of ‘failure to provide care’ is the perpetrator’s failure to perform his obligation 
to provide care for the victim who cannot care for himself due to his condition or old age, 
thereby endangering the latter’s life, bodily integrity or health.37 Usury is conceptually 
committed by taking advantage of a victim in desperate need, usually of financial nature, 
which obviously makes him highly vulnerable.38 Degrading treatment of vulnerable persons 
is a rare misdemeanor relatively newly enacted that may be committed by exploiting the 
victim’s vulnerability to engage in conduct to humiliate himself.39
Several offenses are considered to be a ‘a bit tricky’ in this respect. The victim of 
nonsupport is the parent or custodian of the child, as they are the person the maintenance 
should be paid, not to the child directly. 40 However, this offense obviously affects the child 
as well. The victim of domestic violence can be almost any person living in the same 
household with the perpetrator yet the victim is always one of the weaker and more exposed 
family members in reality.41 The victim of the felony ‘violation of family status’ may be 
any individual yet it is hard to imagine any other victim than an infant.42 Violence against a 
member of a community may be committed against any national, ethnic, racial or religious 
group, or a certain community of the society on grounds of disability, gender identity or 
sexual orientation in particular, or any members of the said group.43 The targeted group may 
also include the national minority;44 in practice, however, victims of this offense belong to 
any form of minority which is not necessarily an ethnic, national or sexual one; for instance, 
it was ‘the homeless people’ in one case.45 The same applies to the endangered groups of 
the felony of inciting against a community.46
While the offenses above protect or usually protect particularly vulnerable persons, 
many others are more general, where the victim’s vulnerability is a qualifying circumstance 
33 Act V of 2013 s 2:10 (1). A person above the age of 16 and under the age of 18 years may 
only marry with the leave of the guardian authority.
34 BH.1981.51, BH.1984.265.
35 Btk. s 210, 211.
36 Btk. s 366 (1) c).
37 Btk. s 167.
38 Btk. s 381.
39 Btk. s 225.
40 Btk. s 212 (1).
41 Btk. s 221/A.
42 Btk. s 213 (1). In several cases, the penalty is raised if the victim is a person under 18 years 
[Btk s 213 (2)].
43 Btk. s 216.
44 In one case, the defendants of Roma origin assaulted majority Hungarians due to ethnic 
reasons (Tribunal of Miskolc 4.Fk.1188/2011/217.)
45 Tribunal of Szeged 1.Fk.95/2013/57.
46 Btk. s 332.
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with more severe penalty. Distinction is usually made upon the age of the victim. Sexual 
violence has a complex classification system rendering more severe penalties to the offense 
if the victim is under the age of 18 years, and even more severe ones, if they are under 12 
years.47 Similarly thereto, kidnapping, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation 
is punished more strictly if the victim is under 18 years and very severely if they are under 
14.48 Homicide is punishable by life imprisonment, if the victim was under the age of 14 
and indecent exposure also has a similar qualifying circumstance, although with not as 
grievous consequences.49
Quite a lot offenses expand the enhanced protection to victims under 18 in their 
classification systems. This group includes aiding and abetting suicide, drug trafficking, 
drug possession, abuse of new psychoactive substances, abuse of performance enhancers, 
forced labor and violation of personal freedom. The victim’s age results in a more severe 
penalty in all cases.50
Upon further analysis of the special part of Btk., one may discover that various forms 
of being underage is not the only qualifying circumstance considering the vulnerability of 
the victim. Moreover, the real novelty of the current criminal code is that it takes into 
consideration the victim’s old age or disability as well for several offenses. It is a new 
qualifying circumstance of homicide, battery, robbery, embezzlement and fraud, if the 
victim’s ability to defend himself or to recognize the crime is diminished due to their old 
age or disability.51 It is worth mentioning that not old age or disability itself establishes the 
qualifying circumstance but its possible effect of weakening the ability of self-defense. The 
legislature here seems to follow what English literature has already realized that the key 
element is not age, but the degree of vulnerability. Age may only increase the likelihood of 
vulnerability which arises from disability, lack of capacity, frailty, or in some cases through 
heavy dependency on the abuser.52 This might be why the legislature left to the practice to 
determine the boundaries of these factors, instead of setting up an age-limit and creating a 
definition on disability or referring to an existing regulation thereon. 
Homicide and battery has another qualifying circumstance with regard to the particular 
vulnerability of the victim: the (complete) disability of self-defense.53 These two qualifying 
circumstances may not concur. The courts consequently establish the latter qualifying 
circumstance only when the victim’s ability to self-defense is completely missing, not 
diminished, due to their old age or disability.54 There is another crucial difference: Old age 
is, in the present state of scientific knowledge, a permanent state, while disability to self-
defense can be temporary, e.g. if the victim is tied up or simply asleep.55 Violation of 
personal freedom and sexual violence have a similar qualifying circumstance considering 
disability to self-defense as well;56 the latter, as mentioned above, also has qualifying 
47 Btk. s 197 (3) a); 197 (2) (4) a).
48 Btk. s 190 (2) a), 192 (4) b) (5) b) d), 196 (2) a) vs. 190 (3) a), 195 (5) a) (6) a), 196 (3).
49 Btk. s 160 (2) i) and (4); 205 (2).
50 Btk. s 162 (2); 177 (1) a) b), 179 (1) a) b) (2); 184/A (1) a) b), 184/C (1) a) b); 185 (3) a) b) 
(5); 193 (2) c) 194 (2) a) (3).
51 Btk. s 160 (2) k); 164 (4) c); (6) c); 365 (3) g); 372 (4) c); 373 (4) c).
52 Bridgeman and others (2008) 98.
53 Btk. s 160 (2) j), 164 (4) b) (6) b).
54 Criminal Uniformity Decision No. 3 of 2013 (3/2013. BJE) II. 11.
55 Criminal Uniformity Decision No. 3 of 2013 II. 10., Btk. s 459 (1) 29.
56 Btk. s 194 (2) b), 197 (1) b).
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circumstances for child victims. These two offenses, however, have no specific qualifying 
circumstance for old or disabled victims.
Finally, there is a fourth, less obvious layer of protection that may not be directly 
found in the Criminal Code. When imposing penalty, the court shall adjust it to the severity 
of the criminal offense, the degree of culpability, the social dangerousness of the perpetrator, 
and to other aggravating and mitigating circumstances.57 Aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances may be different from case to case; judicial practice, however, has elaborated 
an indicative system thereof.58 Several characteristics of the victim shall be taken into 
account as an objective factor influencing penalty, and this is where particular vulnerability 
may play a role as an aggravating factor. Such trait of the victim may be if they are old, 
sick, incapable of self-defense or in the need for protection (like children), pregnant or, in 
case of offenses against property, having financial difficulties.59 
The (potential) vulnerability of the victim entails an aggravating factor in case of 
criminal attempt as well. On the other hand, this aggravating factor may only be applied 
when the perpetrator was or, in case of negligent act, at least should have been aware of the 
victim’s particular vulnerability.60 Judicial practice is also unanimous due to an interpretation 
of the principle ne bis in idem that no fact may be deemed as an aggravating or mitigating 
factor if the same circumstance is also either an element of the criminal act itself, or it 
constitutes a qualifying circumstance.61 
It must also be noted that when applying the said aggravating factor, the term victim is 
used in its substantive sense (Section 2), thus including the person directly affected by the 
result as well. For any other substantive instruments represented in this chapter, the victim 
means the ‘passive subject’ only.
4. VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Before inspecting the procedural position of the victim, for the purposes of this chapter, the 
victim shall be defined as the aggrieved party as represented in Section 2. This notion is 
way broader than the passive subject applied in the previous part of the paper but it is also 
to be kept in mind that judicial practice applies the said heavy restrictions.
Hungarian jurisprudence traditionally divides participants of the criminal procedure to 
main parties (defendant, counsellor, prosecutor) and secondary or ‘side-parties’, among 
others, the victim.62 In Nagypál’s words, the procedural role of the victim is marginalized. 
From a historical main participant, he became a mere stunt, a weak witness and is often 
57 Btk. s 79 (1).
58 Opinion No. 56 of 2007 of the Criminal Chamber of the Curia (BKv. 56/2007).
59 Opinion No. 56 of 2007 of the Criminal Chamber of the Curia III. 4.
60 For instance, early stage of pregnancy may not be apparent to not only the perpetrator, but to 
the victim as well. In this case, the court may not take this fact into account as an aggravating 
circumstance.
61 E.g. in case of the offense ‘abuse of a minor’, the victim is necessarily a child, so this means 
no further aggravating factor. Likewise, committing a homicide against a person incapable of self-
defense changes the legal classification and raises the punishment imposable already [Btk. s 160 (1) 
(2) j)], therefore the victim’s incapability is no aggravating factor. Both phenomena help avoiding 
‘double jeopardy’ in the sense that any single fact may be and shall be evaluated only once.
62 Cséka and others (2006) 40–1. 
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treated that way as well, which may often contribute to secondary victimization.63 From 
these words, it is important to see that the position of the victim inevitably mingles with the 
position of the witness, which also applies to their protection.
The Code has very few specific provisions on particularly vulnerable victims so it is 
necessary to see first how victims are treated in general. The victim, heard as a witness or 
not, has a few general rights such as being present at procedural actions and inspecting the 
documents of the case affecting them (unless the act provides otherwise); filing motions and 
observations; obtaining information on their rights and obligations; and, against certain 
decisions seeking legal remedy.64 Another new provision is that a person of their choice 
may also be present at their hearings.65
The victim, as seen in Section 2, may also submit a civil claim, in which case they are 
called ‘private party’.66 All these rights may also be exercised via a representative.67 
Although this instrument is most commonly used and courts oblige the defendant to pay 
indemnification whenever requested by the victim, in reality, only 4 to 6 percent of the 
damages caused by criminal offenses is indeed recovered in or after the criminal 
proceedings.68 In the rest of the cases, the convict fails to voluntarily pay and execution is 
either not initiated or remains inefficient.
Aside from being an important witness, the victim may play a more significant role 
when acting as a private accuser or a substitute private accuser.69 In both cases, the victim 
represents the charges thereby quasi uniting the position of the victim and the prosecutor.70 
Being a substitute private accuser gives the victim a very strong procedural position, as 
they may in this case exercise almost full powers of the prosecutor given that the latter did 
not submit an indictment for several reasons.71 There is no surprise that prosecutors 
considered this instrument with some skepticism before it entered into force.72
The instruments of protection mostly target the witness that can actually also be the 
victim of the crime. The goal of protection is to guard the witness’s life and freedom so that 
they can fulfill ones duty on giving a testimony without intimidation.73 The mildest and 
most common means thereof is treating the personal date of the witness confidentially, 
ensuring that only the authorities learn their whereabouts.74 
A specially protected witness is a much stronger and rarer instrument of protection. 
In this case, the person of the witness is totally unknown to the defendant (and his 
counsellor), therefore the former is interrogated exclusively by the investigating judge and 
only an extract of their statement is attached to the case-file, while the protocol of the 
63 Nagypál (2011) 24.
64 Be. s 51 (2). For a more detailed catalogue of the victim’s procedural rights, see Kiss (2009) 
63–8. 
65 Be. s 184 (2); Directive art 20.
66 Be. s 54 (1).
67 Be. s 56 (1) (5).
68 Lencsés (2008).
69 Nagypál (2011) 24.
70 Tóth (2003) 506.
71 See note 10. Participation of a legal representative is compulsory.
72 Kiss (2003) 14.
73 Be. s 95.
74 Be. s 96. Confidential data handling is, in practice, granted whenever the witness asks for it, 
although courts and other authorities could reject such request if they consider it inappropriate.
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hearing is confidential.75 This instrument violates the principle of immediacy, as the witness 
remains hidden not only from the defendant’s side, but, to some extent, from the judge as 
well.76 On the other hand, this solution may undermine the defendant’s right to fair trial if 
the verdict is based on anonymous testimonies and no other evidence supports guiltiness.77 
It is worth mentioning that no provision of Be. prevents this from happening,78 which would 
certainly violate defendant’s rights.79 For all the said disadvantages, special protection 
usually provides enough safety to the witness who only meets the investigating judge during 
the whole process, most likely two times at most.80 Unfortunately, the victim cannot always 
become a protected witness, as the person is likely to be known to the defendant.
Physical protection of the victim and other parties to the procedure is not in details 
regulated by the Code, however the court, the prosecutor or the investigating authority may 
initiate the personal protection of any participant of the procedure.81 Hungarian law also 
provides a Defense Program for Witnesses, which may include building up a complete new 
identity for the witness.82 
In addition to all the means above, several further procedural provisions might also 
help protecting the witness, as various authors indicated. A written statement is usually 
requested from a witness who cannot appear in person, but it also avoids direct connection 
between the witness and the defendant.83 For the same reason, interrogating via 
video-conference may also have the same effect,84 although Hungarian courts are technically 
unprepared for its wide application. Pretrial detention may be ordered on the ground that 
the defendant is assumed to try to impede, hinder or endanger collecting evidence by means 
of influencing or intimidating the witness,85 which makes detention also an alternative and 
strong means of witness protection.86 As an alternative of detention, a restraining order can 
also protect the victim.87 The omission of confrontation between witness and defendant can 
also spare the former from direct contact or intimidation.88 The court may try in camera, 
among other reasons, to protect the minor participant or any other party.89
Many of these means separate the defendant and witness. Although the former always 
has at least a right to motion questions and this paper has simply not enough expanse for a 
deeper analysis, it is important to see the possible and dangerous conflict with defendant 
75 Be. s 97, 213 (2).
76 Boros (2012) 4.
77 Bérces (2012) 5.
78 Szabó (2014) 35.
79 See for example: ECHR Kostovski v The Netherlands App no 11454/85 (20 November 1989) 
para 37–45.
80 The first interrogation by the investigating judge is during the investigation. In the trial phase, 
the defendant may read the extract of the testimony and motion further questions. If the judge accepts 
this motion, he requests the investigating judge for a new hearing. This hearing might be repeated a 
few times in theory, but it is highly improbable that the panel trying the case would request further 
hearings a second (third, etc) time.
81 Be. s 98. Details are provided in Government Regulation No 34 of 1999 (26 February).
82 See Act LXXXV of 2001.
83 Tremmel (2008) 146.
84 Kertész (2001) 31.
85 Be. s 129 (1) b).
86 Csányi (2010) 218.
87 Szabó (2012) 90.
88 Csányi (2010) 217.
89 Be. s 237 (2) b)–c); Csányi (2010) 220.
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rights. Too much separation can easily undermine the right to fair trial, as a number of 
studies indicate.90 The latest series of ECHR decisions indicate that the key to preserve the 
fairness of the procedure is to provide sufficient opportunity for the defense to challenge a 
witness’s testimony.91 Speaking of separation, the Implementing Act also amended the Be. 
providing that the authorities shall seek to avoid unnecessary contact between victim and 
defendant.92
The Framework Decision provided without much explanation that the member states 
‘shall seek to promote’ mediation ‘when appropriate.’93 Being more elaborate in general, 
the Directive realized the potential jeopardies of restorative justice and put its focus on 
proper safeguards.94 According to the Directive, mediation shall only be used if it is in the 
interest of the victim,95 while Be. has a more complex aim of improving the compensation 
of the victim and the compliance of the defendant. Despite the different emphasis, it is clear 
that the main advantage of successful mediation is the fast recovery of the victim’s damages 
and the Be. applies the necessary safeguards in favor of the victim, as the procedure may 
only be commenced upon their voluntary consent. Mediation is only successful when the 
defendant and the victim reaches a voluntary agreement and the criminal procedure is only 
terminated when this agreement is indeed fulfilled.96 
The scope of mediation has been slightly expanded in several steps since its 
introduction.97 However, there is no place for mediation in private accusation cases, 
although this is where the victim otherwise truly control the procedure. According to the 
Curia, the pretrial hearing aimed at settling the dispute has the same function.98 The free 
negotiating and agreement gives considerable liberty to both parties but it also implies the 
possibility that the victim accepts an indemnification lower than the actual damages but it 
ensures some reimbursement at all.99
As for particularly vulnerable victims, the Be. traditionally has quite many special 
provisions on child witnesses under 14 years who may be heard at all in case the evidence 
obtained from their testimony cannot be substituted by other means.100 Furthermore, such 
witness and any other person incapable of understanding the significance of the denial of 
testimony due to their mental state, may be only heard upon the consent of the holder of the 
custody who, on the other hand, may be present during the hearing.101 Child witnesses are 
also consequently separated from the defendant as they may not attend the trial and they are 
heard by the investigating judge or the investigating authority.102 Subsequently, they may 
  90 E.g. König and others (2013; Kádár (2011); to some extent Schünemann (2009).
  91 E.g. König and others (2013; Kádár (2011); to some extent Schünemann (2009).  
  92 Be. s 62/B (1).
  93 Framework Decision art 10.
  94 Directive Preamble s 46, art 12.
  95 Directive art 12 1. (a).
  96 Be. s 221/A. Might be worth mentioning at this point that the recovery of the victim’s 
damages is also evaluated as a mitigating practice in substantial law, even when it is partial or 
regardless of the perpetrator’s conduct [see Görgényi (2006) 132–4].
  97 Now it may be applied to misdemeanors and felonies punishable by an imprisonment of no 
more than 5 years against life, physical integrity or health, personal freedom, human dignity and 
fundamental rights, property or intellectual property rights; and any traffic offense [Btk. s 29 (1)].
  98 Opinion No. 3. of 2007 of the Criminal Chamber of the Curia (3/2007 BKv.) II/a.
  99 Róth (2009) 144.
100 Be. s 86 (1).
101 Be. s 86 (2) (3).
102 Be. s 207 (4), 213 (2) (3).
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only be re-interrogated on trial in case it is ultimately necessary, provided that they have 
reached the age of 14 by that time.103 A witness under 14 may only be confronted with the 
defendant or another witness, if the situation does not intimidate him,104 so a child’s 
confrontation is also, in Fenyvesi’s words, ‘an undesirable method in general.’105
Even before the implementation, a relatively new general rule applied on any 
individual, being a victim or in any other position, under the age of 18 years or being blind, 
speech or hearing impaired, or mentally disabled. To all these persons, legal warnings shall 
be composed in a way so that they can understand it.106 The Implementing Act, amending 
the Code further, also obliged the authorities to make sure that the person affected actually 
understood the warnings and to explain them when necessary.107 Prior to the Implementing 
Act, only one group of particularly vulnerable victims, namely the victims of certain serious 
crimes had the right to be notified of the defendant’s (convict’s) release from prison upon 
their request. 108 The Implementing Act turned this into a general right for any victims.109
The greatest achievement of the Implementing Act was obviously that it has finally 
introduced the instrument of particularly vulnerable victims (translated somehow as 
‘victims of specific needs’).110 The act gives no definition but instead provides that the 
authorities shall constantly monitor if the victim is particularly vulnerable based upon either 
their personal conditions or the circumstances of the offense.111 Should the authority come 
to the conclusion that the victims are indeed particularly vulnerable, it should proceed with 
‘maximum consideration’. It shall record their hearing, interrogate them via the investigative 
judge, through video-conference or in camera, whenever these solutions do not conflict 
with fair procedure.112 Another novel provision provides that victims of sexual crimes or 
family violence shall be interrogated by a person of the same sex during the investigation if 
so desired.113
5. ADMINISTRATIVE MEANS OF SUPPORT IN A NUTSHELL
The aid for victims of crime is regulated by a separate statute Act CXXXV of 2005 
(hereinafter ‘Ást.’) which contains a broader notion of the victim, as mentioned Section 2, 
For the application of Ást., the victim means any victim of crime in its procedural sense; 
any victim of minor offenses against property and any other natural person who suffered 
physical, mental or emotional harm or economic loss as a direct consequence of a criminal 
offense or a minor offense against property.114 This is the closest Hungarian definition of the 
103 Be. s 293.
104 Be. s 124 (3).
105 Fenyvesi (2008) 36.
106 Be. s 62/A cf Directive art 3 para 1–2.
107 Implementing Act s 7.
108 The victim shall also be informed of this right. [Be. s 51 (4), 214 (4), 261 (4) cf Directive art 
6. para 5–6].
109 Implementing Act s 4 (4).
110 Implementing Act s 8; Be. s 62/C.
111 Be. s 62/C (1) (2); child victims are presumed to be particularly vulnerable, as seen already 
in the Directive at Chapter 2.
112 Be. s 62/C (3) (4).
113 Be. s 86/A.
114 Ást. s 1 (1). The act, as a distinction, uses the Hungarian term ‘áldozat’.
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victim in line with EU law however it is only applied by the said act,115 or, in Ilona 
Görgényi’s words, it is a combination of the definitions of the Be. and the Framework 
Decision.116
The act provides broad access to information and legal advice for the victims, 
considering not only their procedural rights and duties, but aid and support available, 
governmental and non-governmental organizations they may contact, means of avoiding 
repeated victimization, etc.117 The victim support service i.e. the governmental organization 
dealing with such cases, may also provide two forms of financial assistance. Immediate 
financial aid may be paid for the victim to cover their food, shelter, clothing, travel and 
healthcare costs, should they be not able to bear them as a consequence of the offense.118 
The victim, based on their social circumstances, may also be entitled to a financial 
compensation that may be total or limited depending on the amount of the damage caused 
by the offense.119 Upon request, the authority proceeding with the criminal or minor offense 
case shall provide a certificate within a day that contains all the necessary information for 
the victim support service to decide.120 A novel feature of the Implementing Act is the 
inclusion of psychological support services.121
From another perspective, services provided by the victim support service may be 
divided into various forms of victim-care assistance every victim is entitled to, and to 
compensation that is provided only on a means tested basis.122 
Victim support services have grown quite popular among the victims over the years. 
As a flipside, some research and statistical data raise suspicions that the prospect of financial 
support attracts fraudulent victims as well, thus these subsidies, and immediate financial aid 
in particular, gain an unwanted social function.123
The implementation did not leave the text of the Ást. untouched, yet it still does not 
have any expressed provision on particularly vulnerable victims. As some improvement, 
however, the victim support service shall henceforth individually assess the victim’s specific 
needs and offer services in accordance with those.124
6. EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM AND CONCLUSIONS
The evaluation of Hungarian criminal law from the very special perspective of this paper 
should start at its substantive level. The Btk. is a rather strict criminal code when compared 
to other European countries;125 offenses against susceptible individuals are punished even 
115 Cf Directive art. 2. 1 a) as described in Section 2.
116 Görgényi (2008) 63.
117 Ást. s 24–26/A, 34 cf Framework Decision art 4.
118 Ást s 4, 27.
119 Ást. s 7. These provisions implement Council Directive 2004/80/EC of 29 April 2004 
relating to compensation to crime victims. 
120 Ást. s 11.
121 Ást. s 26/B; Implementing Act s 30.
122 Schweighart (2009) 57–61.
123 Kerezsi & Kó (2008) 155.
124 Ást. s 23 (2).
125 For instance, one may see a deep, comparative analysis of the criminal sanctions of 11 EU 
member states considering certain offenses in the European Commission’s ‘Study on Criminal 
Sanction Legislation and Practice in Representative Member States’ (2014) see at link 1.
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more strictly and an amendment, as presented in Section 3 provides extra protection for 
children at the general level against the most serious crimes. Consequently, there is no any 
room for further enhancement. 
The victim’s procedural position is far worse. As Kiss remarked, the Be. regulates their 
rights at many separate parts, resulting in a ‘chaotic picture’ for lay people, therefore victims 
‘subsist at the periphery of the judicial system.’126 The author agrees with Szabó that it is 
merely a matter of time before the discrepancy between the legal notion of the victim and 
the practical interpretation thereof triggers another case at ECHR,127 even if the position of 
the Curia is that these rules unchanged for over a century have never required any further 
interpretation.128 An idea, which might not be the simplest one, is that this time the law 
should be adjusted to practice upon enacting a new definition for the aggrieved party, which 
would be identical to the restrictive procedural approach. This would make clear who may 
act as a private party and request damages, etc. Simultaneously and in order to fully 
implement the Directive, the legislature should introduce a new party to the procedure, 
another type of victim in the sense meant by the Directive (‘áldozat’ in Hungarian), and 
very carefully decide which rights may each victim exercise and which ones merely the 
aggrieved party.
Although the Be. proudly announces that it has been harmonized with the Directive,129 
this implementation is still not at all perfect. No expressed provisions prevent victims from 
being questioned repeatedly, although, as an improvement, authorities shall at least strive 
on doing (without any consequence of failure).130 Although more and more special premises 
are adapted for hearing children, some other measures are still missing. There is no rule that 
interviews with a particularly vulnerable victim should be carried out by or through 
professionals trained for that purpose or that all such interviews should be made by the 
same person within one phase of the procedure at least.131
Another general remark is that one can see that almost all the protective measures for 
particularly vulnerable victims target the witness. These instruments are able to provide 
acceptable safety when applied properly but that protection should start earlier. Albeit 
criminal procedure is just one link in this chain that cannot solve everything, the author 
agrees with a comment from Schünemann that making it easier for the victim to testify is 
only the last step in protection.132 The above suggested separation of the victim and 
aggrieved party could make some space for improvement.
Even if the defendant is obliged within the criminal proceedings to pay damages to the 
victim, the costs and risk of executing such obligation on the defendant is still borne by the 
victim. According to Róth, the ideal solution would be from the victim’s aspect if the 
execution of the compensation had priority over any other financial sanction (fine, costs of 
the proceedings, etc.).133 Agreeing with the direction of the idea, it must be emphasized that 
it is not easily achievable. By a mere amendment of civil execution rules, the legislature 
126 Kiss (2003) 69.
127 Szabó (2014) 32.
128 Justification of 2009 n Criminal Uniformity Decision No 3 of 2004 (3/2004 BJE), Chapter I.
129 Be. s 608 (7).
130 Be. s 62/B (2); Directive art 20. 
131 Directive art 23 para 2. 
132 Schünemann (2009) 388.
133 Róth (2011) 164.
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could and should grant priority to the victim’s damages over procedural costs.134 Fines are, 
on the other hand, turned into imprisonment upon nonfeasance and this is why convicts are 
way more likely to pay the fine than costs and damages. The only step might and needed to 
be taken in this situation is to introduce a form of guarantee from the state at the expense of 
the fines voluntarily paid. Resultantly, if the fine has been paid the state would advance or 
partly advance the damages of the victim from it and then try to execute damages as a civil 
claim on its own.135 
While the introduction of mediation was surrounded by some skepticism,136 it has 
proved to be a working instrument over the years following some minor amendments and 
has not taken that 15 to 20 years as predicted by Bérces.137 Rules of mediation live up to 
EU requirements and therefore the scope of it should not be extended to more serious 
crimes. Still there are ways to evolve. It is a rather old idea from jurisprudence that ensuring 
mediation for private accusation cases would help the workload of the courts diminish 
while the culture of dispute resolution through direct negotiations could become more 
widespread in the society. After all, these cases are typically those where criminal sanctions 
cannot solve the core conflict.138 The agreement reached through mediation should be null 
and void if the agreed compensation does not reach the victim’s actual damages. This 
amendment would protect, above all, those particularly vulnerable victims that are scared of 
or dependent on the defendant.139
This paper has been written during the early steps of the codification of Hungary’s new 
criminal procedure statute. According to the government’s official concept thereof, the new 
act should, among others, fully implement the Directive.140 The government also realized 
that as a basic guideline of re-codification, more emphasis and attention shall be devoted to 
the victim, supporting them by any means available.141 The document also senses that 
redrafting of the notion of the victim should be ‘considered’ and calls for a swift and – in 
the author’s opinion – inevitable change of attitude.142 From the legislature’s side, it means 
that the traditional view of the interests of the defendant must be adjusted in the light of the 
legitimate interests of victims.143 From the practitioners’ side, it entails the need of training, 
another objective of the Directive.144 And it is also a matter of self-training and devotion –
any written law is no more and no less than what we make it.
134 Act LIII of 1994 s 165 (1). Now it is exactly the other way round.
135 This solution has some costs to the state, but losing a part of the fines imposed in criminal 
sentences should be irrelevant from the financial perspective of the state, especially when compared 
to the interest of the victim.
136 Tarr (2006).
137 Bérces (2009) 153.
138 Törzs (2008) 240.
139 Alternatively, the consent of the mediator could be required for the validity of such 
agreement.
140 ‘Az új büntetőeljárási törvény szabályozási elvei’ (2015) see at link 2, 7.
141 ‘Az új büntetőeljárási törvény szabályozási elvei’ (2015) see at link 2, 10.
142 ‘Az új büntetőeljárási törvény szabályozási elvei’ (2015) see at link 2, 11.
143 McEwan (2009) 370.
144 Directive art 25. The very idea of this paper was conceived when I had the opportunity to 
take part on a series of trainings organized by the judicial academies of the Visegrád countries, with 
the support of the EU.
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